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Abstract
This study examines the relationship between gender and juvenile justice processing 
outcomes for status offenders. The feminist criminological concept of judicial 
paternalism suggests that official justice systems, as gendered institutions with 
traditional patriarchal norms, will treat delinquent girls differently than delinquent 
boys. This paternalistic effect should be especially prevalent for status offenses, 
which are used to enforce institutional (parental, school, civic, parochial) authority. 
Using 1999-2001 juvenile processing data for 3,329 status offense referrals to the 
Oklahoma Office of Juvenile Affairs (N = 3,329) and controlling for age, race, prior 
history, type of status offense, and measures of social class and urban environment, 
our results indicate that (a) girls outnumber boys among status offenders, (b) girls are 
more likely than boys to have their petitions filed for review, (c) girls are less likely 
than boys to be adjudicated guilty, and (d) girls are just as likely as boys to receive an 
incarcerated custody sentence as opposed to probation. We argue that these results 
illustrate the manifestation of the juvenile justice system as a gendered institution in 
which the adjudication of status offenders reflects judicial paternalism.
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Introduction
Female offenders tend to be overshadowed in proportion to males at virtually every 
stage of criminal justice processes. As a result, criminological theories tend to neglect 
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the inclusion of women, despite evidence that female and male offenders have notably 
different experiences within the justice system (Belknap & Holsinger, 2006; Britton, 
2011; Chesney-Lind, 1977; Chesney-Lind, 1989; Chesney-Lind & Sheldon, 2004; 
Pollock, 2002; Tracy, Kempf-Leonard, & Abramoske-James, 2009).
Gender differences are especially salient in the case of juvenile status offenses. 
Status offenses are acts considered deviant by a recognized authority due to the minor-
ity status of the offender. Status offenses for minors include (but are not limited to) 
running away, violating curfews, engaging in truancy, and consumption of alcohol or 
tobacco. Scholars note that while boys are more likely to enter the juvenile justice 
system for criminal offenses, girls are more likely to enter as status offenders (Chesney-
Lind & Sheldon, 2004; Datesman & Scarpitti, 1977; Mann, 1979; Odem, 1995; 
Sheldon, Horvath, & Tracy, 1989). Although male and female juveniles both commit 
status offenses in similar proportions (Cernkovich & Giordano, 1979; Chesney-Lind 
& Sheldon, 2004; Snyder & Sickmund, 1999),1 status offenses are unique because 
they represent the only area in the juvenile justice system where girls outnumber boys 
(Carr, Hudson, Hanks, & Hunt, 2008; Maguire & Pastore, 2001; Teilmann & Landry, 
1981; Tracy et al., 2009).
Feminist scholars suggest that this gender differential reflects a double-standard 
which curtails female offenders’ autonomy by pathologizing female disobedience 
(Carr et al., 2008; Chesney-Lind, 1977; Chesney-Lind & Sheldon, 2004; Feld, 2009). 
This gender bias reflects the historical origin of status offense laws as a means of “pro-
tecting” young women from threats against White, middle-class, Victorian morality 
(Odem, 1995), and thus manifests into attitudes and discretion biases referred to as 
“judicial paternalism” (Chesney-Lind, 1977; Daly, 1989).
This study examines juvenile justice processing outcomes among male and female 
status offenders to test the applicability of two interpretations of judicial paternalism, 
the chivalry hypothesis (Crew, 1991; Gruhl, Welch, & Spohn, 1984) and the “evil 
woman” hypothesis (Erez, 1992). In addition, we situate these feminist concepts 
within the larger theoretical framework of formal and bounded rationality in the crimi-
nal justice system (Belknap, 2007; Black & Reiss, 1970; Carter, 1979; Cohen & 
Klugel, 1978, 1979a, 1979b) to integrate feminist perspectives on gender with main-
stream criminological research.
The Juvenile Justice System and Gender in Historical Perspective
Within the context of patriarchal societies, institutions arise to respond to the needs 
of men, including women only peripherally as issues arise (Acker, 1990; Britton, 
2011; Carr et al., 2008). The development of the juvenile justice system provides one 
such example. The juvenile justice system evolved from the child-saving movement 
of the late 1800s. The original intent of the juvenile justice system was to separate 
youth from adult offenders; adults who committed criminal acts were to be punished, 
while youths who committed criminal acts would receive treatment (Platt, 1977; 
Rothman, 1980; Ryerson, 1978; Tanenhaus, 2004). Initially, only criminal offenses 
were brought before the courts, but soon after reformers created a new type of 
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offense—status offenses. Boys and girls alike were no longer adjudicated for crimi-
nal acts alone, but also for behaving in a manner that was considered “inappropriate” 
for their age (Feld, 2009).
The acts considered appropriate for juveniles were shaped by Progressive Era 
expectations of gender. At that time, middle-class sexual morality became rationalized 
by appealing to a “scientific” concern regarding the spread of venereal disease. Sexual 
immortality was no longer a personal shortcoming, but a social menace (Hawkes, 
2002). First prostitutes, then working-class women/girls in general, were presented as 
the traffickers of sexual diseases by media campaigns aimed at protecting the “troops” 
(Luker, 1998). Thus, the social threats of an out-of-control and criminal male youth 
and increasing amounts of venereal disease spread by “immoral girls” helped to foster 
the juvenile justice system as a needed and valuable social institution. Although the 
juvenile justice system played a paternalistic role in sentencing boys as well as girls, 
girls and boys were held to different standards of behavior. For girls, the violation of 
traditional moral codes regarding femininity became a state matter, as did the rehabili-
tation of delinquent girls into their proper roles as dependent, controllable, and virtu-
ous young women (Chesney-Lind, 1989; Odem & Schlossman, 1991). Thus, the 
juvenile justice system focused on curtailing the criminal behavior of boys and enforc-
ing the sexual morality of girls (Chesney-Lind, 1977; Chesney-Lind & Sheldon, 2004; 
Freedman, 1981; Odem, 1995; Schlossman, 1977; Sutton, 1988; Tanenhaus, 2004).
In the juvenile court system, status offenses became a means to control adolescent 
female sexuality (Schlossman, 1977; Sutton, 1988). The early twentieth century laws 
of morality relied on the assumption that young women require protection from degen-
erative outside forces and from themselves. In comparison with men, women during 
this era were presumed to have a reduced capacity for decision making. Therefore, it 
was imperative for patriarchal authority figures like fathers, husbands, or judges to 
intervene in the lives of women (especially young women) for their own good—fur-
ther curtailing female autonomy. When fathers were not around, or unable to control 
their daughters, the justice system became a surrogate parent by upholding traditional, 
patriarchal family values, often through the “policing” of female sexuality (Sutton, 
1988; Tanenhaus, 2004).
The paternalistic treatment of young women in the juvenile justice system contin-
ued into the late 20th century. Although the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act (JJDPA) was passed in 1974 and reauthorized in 1992, with aims at 
deinstitutionalizing status offenders and redressing gender inequity, some scholars 
suggest that the juvenile justice system continues to disproportionately punish girls in 
ways that curtail their autonomy (Carr et al., 2008; Feld, 2009). To examine the extent 
of judicial paternalism in the juvenile justice system, scholars must first confirm that 
gender inequality is occurring. Though there are several ways to test for gender 
inequality in the juvenile justice system, we have chosen to examine juvenile sentenc-
ing decisions in cases of status offenses. In the following sections, we explore the 
factors that affect sentencing decisions—specifically the influence of bounded and 
formal rationality—and how sentencing decisions relate to the institutional context in 
which status offenses arose.
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Formal and Bounded Rationality in Juvenile Justice Processing
Theories of criminal justice processing tend to follow two generalized approaches: 
formal rationality and bounded rationality. The formal rationality perspective suggests 
that appropriate legal factors such as offense severity and past criminal record explain 
most of the variation in sentencing outcomes (Bailey, 1981; Bishop, 2005; Black & 
Reiss, 1970; Carter, 1979; Cohen & Klugel, 1978, 1979a, 1979b; Dixon, 1995; 
Marshall & Thomas, 1983; Thomas & Sieverdes, 1975; Ulmer, 1997). The formal 
rationality perspective derives from Max Weber’s (1947) work on the rationalization 
of society and the creation of bureaucracy. The justice system is an example of what 
Weber called a rational-legal authority, in which authority is based on the office one 
holds. Presumably, society expects that formal rationality is applied in sentencing 
decisions, as well as throughout the criminal justice process in general. Police, prose-
cutorial, and judicial decisions are expected to be influenced only by universally 
applied legally relevant rules. Studies in sentencing disparity under the formal ratio-
nality model indicate that when accounting for legal factors such as criminal history, 
placement in pre-adjudication detention, and seriousness of charge, the influence of 
extralegal factors is minimized (Belknap, 2007; Carter, 1979; Clarke & Koch, 1980; 
Dannefer & Schutt, 1982; Kempf-Leonard & Sontheimer, 1995; Phillips & Dinitz, 
1982; Teilmann & Landry, 1981).
The bounded rationality perspective emphasizes the influence of extralegal vari-
ables, suggesting that social attitudes, expectations, and biases—including race, gen-
der, and class—play a substantial role in judicial discretion (Albonetti, 1987; Guevara, 
Herz, & Spohn, 2006). Judges are unlikely to gain substantial idiosyncratic knowledge 
about each individual and situation that appears before them in court, and must rely on 
culturally constructed stereotypes, past experiences, social attitudes, and motivations 
to supplement rational-legal factors in sentencing decisions (Albonetti, 1987; Bridges 
& Steen, 1998). Empirical evidence supports the contention that extralegal factors like 
race, gender, and social class contribute to processing outcomes even when legal fac-
tors are considered (Bishop, 2005; Bishop & Frazier, 1996; Bortner, Sunderland, & 
Winn, 1985; Bray, Sample, & Kempf-Leonard, 2005; Conley, 1994; Frazier & Bishop, 
1995; Guevara, Spohn, & Herz, 2004; Leiber, 1994; Thornberry & Christensen, 1984; 
Wordes & Bynum, 1995; Wordes, Bynum, & Corley, 1994).
In specific regard to gender, scholars have found support for bounded rationality. 
Ridgeway (2011) defines gender as assumptions of difference between men and 
women, which structure a hierarchal system of norms that are embedded in social rela-
tions and social institutions, like the criminal justice and juvenile justice system. 
Justice scholars have found evidence that girls and boys are sometimes treated differ-
ently in the juvenile justice system. For example, Hancock (1980) found that girls’ 
sexual morality is mentioned far more often in court referrals than boys’, and 
Gelsthorpe (1986, p. 137) observed that among seemingly identical cases of “problem 
behavior,” police are much more likely to justify intervention for girls than boys, cit-
ing the “moral danger” in girls’ sexual vulnerability and their need for protection. 
Recent research has also confirmed that gendered attitudes continue to characterize the 
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treatment of girls in the juvenile justice system, where workers demonstrate inordinate 
concern with girls’ morality and sexual promiscuity (Baines & Alder, 1996; Belknap, 
Holsinger, & Dunn, 1997; Bond-Maupin, Maupin, & Leisenring, 2002; Mallicoat, 
2007). In the following section, we discuss how the concern with protecting girls’ 
morality manifests itself in juvenile justice decisions, comparing two models of judi-
cial paternalism: the chivalry and evil woman hypotheses.
Judicial Paternalism: Leniency Versus Harshness for Girls
The existence of bounded rationality in the juvenile justice system is a source of debate 
among scholars. In addition, when evidence of bounded rationality is found, meaning 
that scholars find sentencing inequality among groups in the juvenile justice system, 
the cause of the inequality is still unknown. Chesney-Lind (1977) asserts that the 
unequal treatment between male and female offenders is a consequence of judicial 
paternalism. The main concept behind judicial paternalism is protection; specifically, 
protecting women from the criminal justice system, protecting women from them-
selves, and/or protecting children from losing their mother due to incarceration (Daly, 
1989). Therefore, judicial paternalism can be viewed as a type of bounded rationality, 
acting as an extralegal variable that influences judicial discretion.
However, the way that judicial paternalism influences judicial outcomes is unclear 
(Britton, 2011). Scholars have noted that judicial paternalism can lead some members 
of the justice system to be more lenient toward females than males, while other schol-
ars note that judicial paternalism can also lead members of the justice system to treat 
females more harshly than males. The chivalry hypothesis, an extension of judicial 
paternalism, holds that male judicial decision makers apply chivalrous attitudes toward 
female offenders. Consequently, women who commit the same criminal acts as men 
are treated with more leniency, granting them protection from the usual callousness of 
the criminal justice system (Crew, 1991; Farnworth, Teske, & Thurman, 1991; Gruhl 
et al., 1984; Pollak, 1950). When examining the effects of gender on criminal justice 
processing outcomes, researchers have found support for the chivalry hypothesis 
(Blackwell, Holleran, & Finn, 2008; Daly, 1994; Farnworth et al., 1991; Franklin & 
Fearn, 2008; Kempinen, 1983; Kruttschnitt, 1984; Spohn, 1999; Spohn & Welch, 
1987; Willison, 1984). Additionally, studies with juvenile offenders indicate that girls 
receive more leniency than boys, even after prior record and offense seriousness are 
considered (Bishop & Frazier, 1992; Farrington & Morris, 1983; D. R. Johnson & 
Scheuble, 1991; Morris, 1987; Visher, 1983).
Though research finds support for judicial paternalism leading to leniency, some 
scholars have also asserted that judicial paternalism can cause female offenders to be 
treated more severely. Horowitz and Pottieger (1991) suggest that when women violate 
perceived traditional gender roles, they actually receive harsher punishments than do 
men. This form of selective paternalism is known as the “evil woman” hypothesis. The 
evil woman hypothesis states that women who act “unladylike” are punished twice: 
once for the actual criminal act, and again for violating gender norms (Crew, 1991; 
Erez, 1992; Spohn, 1999). Steury and Frank (1990) argue that women are expected to 
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follow traditional gender roles and commit “feminine” crimes, and thus women who 
commit crimes that are considered masculine (e.g., violent acts) receive harsher punish-
ments. This study examines the extent to which gender—an extralegal factor (bounded 
rationality) that carries explicit sociohistorical attitudes involving paternalism—con-
tributes to juvenile processing outcomes for status offense cases by testing the two 
facets of judicial paternalism: the chivalry and evil woman hypotheses.
Gender and Status Offending
Unlike criminal offense cases, court processing decisions in status offense cases are 
less about how much protection to afford the public than how much protection to 
afford the offender. The act of truancy, for example, is of little direct harm to the pub-
lic; rather, the offense is primarily of harm to the offender him/herself. Thus, status 
offenders deemed capable of making their own decisions and taking responsibility for 
their actions, as well as those whom a judge considers beyond help, may be less likely 
to receive judicial attention (e.g., referral filings, adjudication, sentencing).
Despite evidence that male and female juveniles commit status offenses in similar 
proportions (Cernkovich & Giordano, 1979; Chesney-Lind & Sheldon, 2004; Snyder 
& Sickmund, 1999), girls are more likely to be brought into court for status offense 
referrals than for other types of offenses, and the proportion of girls brought to court 
for status offenses outnumbers the proportion of boys (Chesney-Lind & Sheldon, 
2004). Some scholars argue that when girls commit status offenses, they violate cul-
tural ideals of White, middle-class femininity. Since the juvenile justice system was 
created as a method of reforming youths and reinforcing traditional family structure, 
status offenses are meant to act as a form of surrogate parental control (Bishop & 
Frazier, 1992; Chesney-Lind, 1977; Hancock, 1980).
Though research suggests that boys and girls in the juvenile justice system for sta-
tus offenses are treated differently, the directionality of judicially paternalistic atti-
tudes is uncertain. Utilizing the evil woman hypothesis, one would expect girls to be 
treated more punitively than boys. Austin, Krisberg, DeComo, Rudenstine, and Del 
Rosario (1995) found that a larger proportion of girls were committed for status 
offenses than boys, while Sheldon et al. (1989) report that girls were more likely than 
boys to receive formal processing for the same offense, and Mann’s (1979) study 
found that girls received harsher punishments than boys for running away.
Meanwhile, some scholars have found support for the chivalry hypothesis, with 
girls being treated more leniently than boys in the juvenile justice system (Bishop & 
Frazier, 1992; Farrington & Morris, 1983; Morris, 1987; Visher, 1983). MacDonald 
and Chesney-Lind (2001, p. 173), meanwhile, observed both leniency and harshness 
at different stages of the juvenile justice process; girls’ cases were more likely to be 
“handled informally” at early stages in the system, while “the courts’ benevolence 
fades as girls move into the disposition phase.”
Other studies have found support for formal rationality, indicating that boys and girls 
receive similar treatment in status offenses (Teilmann & Landry, 1981), and when 
extralegal variables were controlled, little difference was apparent in the treatment of 
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male and female status offenders (D. R. Johnson & Scheuble, 1991). Thus, past research 
has produced mixed results; some finding support for bounded rationality through the 
evil woman or the chivalry hypotheses (both reflecting judicial paternalism), and others 
supporting formal rationality. Though evidentiary support exists for the formal rational-
ity perspective, we expect to find judicial discretion to be influenced by gender—or the 
existence of bounded rationality. We predict the occurrence of bounded rationality for 
two reasons. First, status offenses emerged in the justice system as way to control youth 
from behaviors that were deemed undesirable for their age. Second, scholars have dem-
onstrated that the policing of female morality has been a concern of the juvenile justice 
system both historically as well as in the present day. Thus, we hypothesize that girls 
will be treated more harshly throughout all stages of the juvenile justice system. We 
expect to find support for the “evil woman” hypothesis, a branch of judicial paternalism 
under the bounded rationality perspective. In this analysis, we will first determine the 
proportion of status offenders who are girls, and then examine the filing, adjudication, 
and disposition decisions among all status offenders.
Figure 1 diagrammatically illustrates the theoretical role of judicial paternalism and 
the chivalry and evil woman hypotheses as conceptualized in this study, within the 
framework of formal and bounded rationality. We propose that judicial paternalism is a 
form of bounded rationality in the juvenile justice system, and in the case of status 
offenses judicial paternalism presents itself through the evil woman hypothesis, causing 
justice officials to treat girls more harshly than boys when committing the same crime.
Hypotheses
Using data collected from the Oklahoma Office of Juvenile Affairs (OJA) from 1999 
to 2001, we examine the extent to which judicial paternalism occurs for status offense 
FORMAL RATIONALITY BOUNDED RATIONALITY
Gender Other extra-legal biases: 
race, social class, etc.
Judicial Paternalism
Chivalry Hypothesis 
(leniency)
Evil Woman Hypothesis 
(harshness)
Legal Factors: Prior 
Offense History, Offense 
Severity, Circumstances 
of the Offense
Figure 1. Diagrammatic illustration of theoretical framework.
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cases in the juvenile justice system. To the extent that judicial processing outcomes 
indicate support for bounded rationality vis-à-vis gender effects, we can begin to 
address whether these differences reflect judicial paternalism through the chivalry and 
evil woman hypotheses. Thus, drawing from the literature reviewed above, we devel-
oped the following hypotheses:
Hypotheses1: Consistent with bounded rationality in the form of judicial paternal-
ism, girls will outnumber boys among status offenders.
Hypotheses 2: When controlling for age, race, prior history, type of status offense, 
and measures of social class and urban environment, girls will be more likely to 
have their cases formally filed for review than boys, reflecting facets of both the 
chivalry and evil woman hypotheses.
Hypotheses 3: When controlling for age, race, prior history, type of status offense, 
and measures of social class and urban environment, girls will be less likely to be 
adjudicated guilty than boys, reflecting judicial paternalism through the chivalry 
hypothesis.
Hypotheses 4: Reflecting the evil woman hypothesis, and consistent with 
MacDonald and Chesney-Lind’s (2001) finding of harsher treatment in the disposi-
tion phase of the juvenile justice system, when controlling for age, race, prior his-
tory, type of status offense, and measures of social class and urban environment, 
girls will be more likely than boys to be sentenced to custody as opposed to 
probation.
Method
The Oklahoma OJA supplied data for all juvenile offenders referred to that agency 
between July 1, 1999 and June 30, 2001. The original number of juveniles in the refer-
ral data set totaled 29,729. After eliminating 4,218 (12.2%) of the cases due to missing 
data or because the juvenile was referred for a non-offense (material witness, order to 
detain, etc.), we filtered the remaining cases (N = 25,511) using each juvenile’s current 
offense, which had been pre-sorted in the original data by the most severe current 
count. We retained all cases whose current count was listed as a status offense 
(Runaway, Truancy, School Behavior Problems, Beyond Parental Control, and In 
Need of Supervision), producing a total of N = 3,329 status offenders. While female 
offenders comprised only 31.5% of the original set of all offenders, they became the 
majority (57.3%) among status offenders.
Dependent Variables
A referral to the OJA can take the form of arrest by law enforcement, but can also 
occur through a parental or school request. Unfortunately, the OJA does not provide 
information about the circumstances under which referrals are made, other than the 
offense type. Upon processing a referral, the agency makes an “intake” decision that 
reflects whether the juvenile will be referred to court for formal handling through a 
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filed court petition. During this process, the juvenile justice system gathers informa-
tion concerning the alleged offense contained in the referral, the juvenile’s prior 
record, and any other relevant information. The district attorney, based on the informa-
tion provided by the OJA, makes the final intake decision as to whether to dismiss the 
case (take no action) or to file a petition. Our dependent variable filed reflects filed 
petitions (coded 1) versus referrals that did not result in filed petitions (coded 0).
Once a petition has been filed, the adjudication process commences. Controlled 
primarily by the district courts, the judicial outcome can take the form of dismissed, 
not guilty, informal probation, guilty (adjudicated delinquent), or transferred to adult 
court. As no status offenders were transferred to adult court and none were found not 
guilty, and only a small proportion were informally probated (see Figure 2), we col-
lapsed our dependent variable adjudicated to reflect those found guilty (coded 1) from 
the rest (coded 0).
Similar to the adjudication process, the district courts make disposition or sentenc-
ing decisions. Once a juvenile has been adjudicated as a delinquent, two primary dis-
position decisions are available: custody or probation. Several other options for 
juvenile court offenders, such as Department of Human Services custody, fines, and 
dismissal, accounted for only 6 of a total of 235 adjudicated delinquents, and were 
eliminated from the final dependent variable custody, leaving only those sent to cus-
tody in a juvenile detention center (coded 1) or placed on official juvenile probation 
(coded 0).
Figure 2 illustrates the juvenile processing pathway of status offenders through the 
Oklahoma OJA, as well as the proportions of male and female juveniles who experi-
ence each justice processing outcome.
Of Total Referrals (3,339) Of Total Filed (433) Of Total Adjudicated (229)
% filed 13.0% 433/3,329 % adjudicated 54.3% 235/443 % custody 30.1% 69/229
% of boys filed 11.2% 160/1,423 % boys adjudicated 66.9% 107/160 % boys custody 24.8% 26/105
% of girls filed 14.3% 273/1,906 % girls adjudicated 46.9% 128/273 % girls custody 34.7% 43/124
Custody         69
Probation               160
DHS Custody, 
Fines, Misc., 
Dismissed
6
Adjudicated                  235
Informal Probation         16
Dismissed                     182
3,329
Filed 
433 (13%)
3,3293,329 3,329
3,094
Not Filed
2,896 (87%) 2,896 3,094
+ =198
198
(1,906 girls, 57.3%)
(1,423 boys, 42.7%)
Figure 2. Diagrammatic illustration of juvenile justice outcomes, all status offense referrals 
1999-2001.
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Independent Variables
The study utilizes eight independent/predictor variables to examine juvenile justice out-
comes on the three dependent measures. These independent variables are categorized 
into the three groups, consisting of (a) general demographic indicators (b) measures of 
social class and environment, and (c) measures of offender and offense characteristics.
Demographic indicators include gender, age, and race. As our theoretical focus 
concerns the way that female juvenile status offenders are treated by the justice sys-
tem, our coding for gender assigns 1 for girls and 0 for boys, and the dummy variable 
is thus called Female. Age is a ratio-level variable. For race, we expand on previous 
studies that use dichotomous definitions of race (Bishop & Frazier, 1988; Bortner & 
Reed, 1985; Frazier & Cochran, 1986; Guevara et al., 2006; J. B. Johnson & Secret, 
1990; McCarthy & Smith, 1986; McGarrell, 1993; Thornberry, 1973) by using a mul-
tiple category taxonomy that considers White, African American (Black), Hispanic, 
and Native American, rather than simply comparing Whites with non-Whites. Measures 
of social class and environment include three items. Government Aid is a dummy-level 
variable indicating whether or not the juvenile’s family receives government aid, 
including Medicaid, TANF, disability, food stamps, or emergency assistance. Juveniles 
whose families are not indicated as receiving government aid are coded 0. Poverty 
Rate in Zip in a ratio-level variable indicating the percentage of families living below 
the poverty level in the juvenile’s residential zip code. The zip codes also indicate a 
characteristic of the juvenile’s residential environment that we categorize into three 
levels of geographic area: Metro, indicating residences within the two largest metro-
politan statistical areas in the state (Oklahoma City and Tulsa), City-Town, for all resi-
dences that lie in areas designated to lie within cities or towns, and Rural for residences 
in areas that are rural (unincorporated, or not designated as a city or town).
The official offender and offense characteristics comprised of measures for the num-
ber of prior referrals, as well as dummy variables for the types of status offenses. The 
variable Number of Priors is a ratio-level indicator of the number of times the juvenile 
has been referred to OJA, including the current referral. Thus, juveniles with a score of 
0 are “first-timers,” while those with a score of 1 have been referred one time in the past, 
those with a score of 2 have been referred two times in the past, and so forth. Finally, 
status offenses are distinguished in four mutually exclusive categories: Runaway, for 
juveniles who are alleged to have run away from their parents or legal guardians, 
Truancy, for juveniles considered to be habitual truants, Behavior Problems, for juve-
niles who have exhibited either unacceptable behavior at school or whose parents have 
declared them to be out-of-control, and In Need of Supervision, a catch-all designation 
for juveniles whose precise status offense designation is uncertain.2 Table 1 displays all 
of the independent and dependent measures in the analyses and their definitions.
Results
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for the 3 dependent variables and 16 independent 
variables. The overall and gender-specific proportions on the processing outcome 
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variables are also depicted as part of the flow diagram in Figure 2. The proportions in 
Table 2, however, are accompanied by Chi-square statistics for gender differences. 
Girls are significantly overrepresented, compared with boys, in the likelihood of hav-
ing their petitions filed, while among all status offenders with filed petitions, girls are 
significantly underrepresented in being adjudicated as guilty. For those adjudicated, 
the frequency outcome for being sentenced to juvenile custody, as opposed to proba-
tion—showing 34.7% of adjudicated girls sent to custody and only 24.8% of adjudi-
cated boys—was only significant at the .10 level.3
Most of the race and social class measures were evenly distributed across gender. A 
slightly larger proportion of boys than girls were African American, as well as belong-
ing to families that received government aid, but again these difference were barely 
significant (only at the .10 level). Notably pronounced, however, were gender differ-
ences in status offense types. Girls were substantially overrepresented among run-
aways: 49.9% of girls were runaways compared with only 34.0% of boys. The other 
Table 1. Variable Definitions.
Variables Definition
Demographic characteristics
 Female Female = 1, else = 0
 Age Years old
 White White = 1, else = 0
 Black Black = 1, else = 0
 Hispanic Hispanic = 1, else = 0
 Native American Native American = 1, else = 0
Social class and environment
 Government aid Family receiving aid = 1, else = 0
 Poverty rate in zip Percentage of families below poverty in zip
 Metro area Oklahoma City or Tulsa MSA = 1, else = 0
 City-town Cities and towns other than Oklahoma City or Tulsa = 1, 
else = 0
 Rural Rural (unincorporated) areas = 1, else = 0
Priors and current offense type
 Number of priors Number of prior referrals to the OJA
 Runaway Runaway = 1, else = 0
 Truancy Habitual truant = 1, else = 0
 Behavior problems Out-of-control at home or school = 1, else = 0
 In need of supervision Count type “In Need of Supervision” = 1, else = 0
Juvenile justice outcomes
 Filed District attorney filed petition = 1, else = 0
 Adjudicated Found guilty (adjudicated delinquent) = 1, else = 0
 Custody Sentenced to juvenile custody = 1, else = 0
Note. MSA = metropolitan statistical area; OJA = Office of Juvenile Affairs.
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three status offenses, truancy, behavior problems, and being in need of supervision, 
were all more prevalent among boys.
Girls were only slightly (but significantly) older (14.9 years old compared with the 
mean of 14.8 for boys) and had substantially less referrals. More than half of girls had 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Comparisons Across Gender.
Nominal variables
Overall Boys Girls
Chi- 
square
N = 3,329 N = 1,423 N = 1,906
n / N (%) n / N (%) n / N (%)
Disposition
 Outcome−Filed 433 / 3,329 (13.0) 160 / 1,423 (11.2) 273 / 1,906 (14.3) 6.83**
 Outcome−Adjudicated 235 / 433 (54.3) 107 / 160 (66.9) 128 / 273 (46.9) 16.24**
 Outcome−Custody 69 / 229 (30.1) 26 / 105 (24.8) 43 / 124 (34.7) 2.66†
Race
 White 2,153 / 3,329 (64.7) 915 / 1,423 (64.3) 1,238 / 1,906 (65.0) 0.15
 Black 497 a/ 3,329 (14.9) 228 / 1,423 (16.0) 269 / 1,906 (14.1) 2.34†
 Hispanic 182 / 3,329 (5.5) 72 / 1,423 (5.1) 110 / 1,906 (5.8) 0.80
 Native American 497 a/ 3,329 (14.9) 208 / 1,423 (14.6) 289 / 1,906 (15.2) 0.19
Social class and environment
 Government aid 1,222 / 3,329 (36.7) 543 / 1,423 (38.2) 679 / 1,906 (35.6) 2.25†
 Metro area 957 / 3,329 (28.7) 402 / 1,423 (28.3) 555 / 1,906 (29.1) 0.30
 City-town 956 / 3,329 (28.7) 401 / 1,423 (28.2) 555 / 1,906 (29.1) 0.35
 Rural 1,416 / 3,329 (42.5) 620 / 1,423 (43.6) 796 / 1,906 (41.8) 1.09
Offense type
 Runaway 1,435 / 3,329 (43.1) 484 / 1,423 (34.0) 951 / 1,906 (49.9) 83.8**
 Truancy 708 / 3,329 (21.3) 354 / 1,423 (24.9) 354 / 1,906 (18.6) 19.34**
 Behavior problems 210 / 3,329 (6.3) 117 / 1,423 (8.2) 93 / 1,906 (4.9) 15.40**
 In need of supervision 976 / 3,329 (29.3) 468 / 1,423 (32.9) 508 / 1,906 (26.7) 15.29**
Continuous variables t test
Age M = 14.9 M = 14.8 M = 14.9 3.36**
 Median = 15.0 Median = 15.0 Median = 15.0  
 SD = 1.8 SD = 1.9 SD = 1.6  
Prior referrals M = 1.3 M = 1.7 M = 1.1 −6.70**
 Median = 0.0 Median = 1.0 Median = 0.0  
 SD = 2.5 SD = 2.9 SD = 2.0  
Poverty rate in zip code M = 13.3 M = 13.3 M = 13.2 −0.35
 Median = 12.2 Median = 12.3 Median = 12.1  
 SD = 6.2 SD = 6.2 SD = 6.1  
aThe equivalent frequencies for Native Americans and African Americans, as well as for metro and city-
town areas, have been rechecked and confirmed as coincidental.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.
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no prior referrals (hence the median of 0), and the average was 1.1 compared with 1.7 
for boys. Neither boys nor girls were more likely to live in poor geographic areas.
Bivariate Relationships
Pearson correlation coefficients, presented in Table 3, indicate the bivariate relation-
ships between each of the 3 outcome variables and the 16 independent variables. As 
similarly reflected in the chi-square results in Table 2, being female increases the 
likelihood of having a status offense case filed, decreases the likelihood of being 
found guilty, and increases the likelihood of being sentenced to custody. However, 
as in the chi-square, the Pearson correlation between being female and being sen-
tenced to custody is weak and only significant at the .10 level. Some of the strongest 
correlates include the greater likelihood of status offenders whose family receives 
government aid being adjudicated guilty and sentenced to custody, the reduced like-
lihood of being adjudicated guilty and being sentenced to custody for status offend-
ers in a metropolitan area (Oklahoma City or Tulsa), and the increased likelihood of 
being having a case adjudicated guilty for status offenders in a non-rural city or town 
outside of the two metro areas. In addition, runaways were less likely to have peti-
tions filed and less likely to have cases adjudicated guilty, but more likely to be 
sentenced to custody, and those in need of supervision were less likely to have their 
petitions filed.
Table 3. Bivariate Pearson Correlations.
Independent variable
Dependent variable
Filed Adjudicated Custody
Female .045** −.194** .108†
Age .025 −.142** −.075
White .017 −.018 −.024
Black −.027 −.004 −.013
Hispanic −.007 −.104* .049
Native .008 .090 .018
Government aid .011 .291** .256**
Poverty rate in zip −.049** .061 .049
Metro .119** −.557** −.152*
City-town −.048** .371** −.051
Rural −.065** .251** .166*
Priors .014 .158** .191**
Runaway −.135** −.262** .171**
Truancy −.061** .147** −.163*
Behavior −.056** .127** −.001
Supervision .232** .084 .008
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.
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Multivariate Models: Tests of Hypotheses
We use binary logistic regression in each of the multivariate analyses to test hypothe-
ses. The first hypothesis, that girls will outnumber boys among status offenders, was 
confirmed in the descriptive data (Figure 2 and Table 2). Of all 3,329 status offenders 
referred during the period, 57.3% were girls while only 42.7% were boys.4
The binary logistic regression models depicted in Table 4 test the second hypothe-
sis, that girls will be more likely than boys to have their petitions formally filed for 
review. Controlling for age and race in Model 1, gender (coded in this study as being 
female = 1) retains its significant positive relationship with the likelihood of having a 
case filed. Interestingly, this relationship (which remains the same when social class 
and geography variables are added) intensifies when offense type is taken into account. 
Interpreting the odds ratio column in Model 3, girls are 55% more likely than boys to 
have their petitions filed than are boys. Clearly, the gender difference in filing was not 
due to differences in offense types; girls’ overrepresentation among runaways and 
underrepresentation among other offense types appears to have been suppressing a 
greater gender effect than observed in the bivariate relationship. We conclude that the 
multivariate analyses confirm Hypothesis 2:
Controlling for age, race, prior history, type of status offense, and measures of social class 
and urban environment, girls are significantly more likely than boys to have their petitions 
formally filed for review.
The models in Table 5 test the third hypothesis, that girls will be less likely than 
boys to be adjudicated guilty. Accounting for age and race, girls remain less likely to 
be adjudicated guilty than boys (only 45% as likely). Once social class and geographic 
variables are taken into account, the odds are only slightly less pronounced (42% as 
likely) and increase modestly to 47% once offense type is added to Model 3. Unlike 
petition filing, type of status offense no longer appears to make a difference in the 
outcome, even though bivariate correlations between offense types and adjudication 
were significant. We conclude that Hypothesis 3 is confirmed:
Controlling for age, race, prior history, type of status offense, and measures of social class 
and urban environment, girls are significantly less likely than boys to have their cases 
adjudicated guilty.
Finally, Table 6 displays regression models testing the fourth hypothesis, that girls 
will be more likely to be sentenced to juvenile detention (custody) than boys. Recall 
that the bivariate relationship between gender and custody (contrary to our expecta-
tion, girls were more likely to be sentenced to custody) was barely significant, and 
only at the .10 level. Once age and race are considered in Model 1, the already weak 
relationship disappears entirely and is not recovered when social class, geographic, 
and offense variables are added in Models 2 and 3. Thus, we fail to confirm Hypothesis 
4, and draw the conclusion that:
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Controlling for age, race, prior history, type of status offense, and measures of social class 
and urban environment, girls are just as likely as boys to be sentenced to juvenile custody.
Figure 3 displays the comparative predicted probabilities for girls and boys out-
comes on each of the dependent measures in Model 3 of each logistic regression, in 
which all the control variables are taken into account. When age, race, prior history, 
type of status offense, and measures of social class and urban environment are consid-
ered, girls have a 12% probability of having their petitions filed for review, whereas 
boys have only a 9% probability. Likewise, girls have a 54% likelihood of having their 
cases adjudicated guilty, while boys have a 77% chance. The predicted probabilities 
for being sentenced to custody appear to be substantial (24% for girls compared with 
18% for boys) but did not reach significance in the regression model (which showed 
that girls were 34% more likely than boys to be sentenced to custody) due to the small 
number of observations (n = 229).
Table 4. Bivariate Logistic Regression for Petition Filed.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
 B Exp (B) B Exp (B) B Exp (B)
Female 0.268* 1.31 0.262* 1.30 0.437** 1.55
Age 0.037 1.02 0.070* 1.07 0.085* 1.09
Race
 White (ref) — — — — — —
 Black −0.220 0.80 −0.278 0.76 −0.288 0.75
 Hispanic −0.126 0.88 −0.232 0.79 −0.138 0.87
 Native American 0.027 1.03 0.173 1.19 0.148 1.16
Government aid 0.331** 1.39 0.244 1.28
Poverty rate in zip −0.022* 0.98 −0.019* 0.98
Geographic area
 Rural (ref) — — — —
 Metro 0.882** 2.41 0.713** 2.04
 City-town 0.064 1.07 −0.099 0.91
Number of priors 0.034 1.04
Offense type
 Runaway (ref) — —
 Truancy 0.393* 1.48
 Behavior problems 0.034 1.04
 In need of supervision 1.486** 4.42
Constant −2.585** 0.075 −3.23** 0.04 −4.177** .015
−2 log likelihood 2,562.35 2,497.16 2,335.97  
N 3,329 3,329 3,329  
Note. Coefficients (B) and Odds Ratios (Exp B).
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Discussion
Our most basic findings begin with confirmation of the first hypothesis that girls in 
fact outnumber boys among status offenders. This result is consistent with past 
research (Carr et al., 2008; Maguire & Pastore, 2001; Teilmann & Landry, 1981; Tracy 
et al., 2009), and as far as we can determine, no other offense category appears to be 
associated with a plurality of girls in the juvenile justice literature. Certainly, this gen-
der gap may be thought to reflect behavior differences between girls and boys, but 
recall that male and female juveniles self-report these offenses in similar proportions 
(Cernkovich & Giordano, 1979; Chesney-Lind & Sheldon, 2004; Snyder & Sickmund, 
1999). Thus, we suggest that the greater likelihood of referring girls to the juvenile 
justice system for such status offenses reflects bounded rationality in the form of judi-
cial paternalism.
Additionally, after controlling for measures of age, race, prior history, type of status 
offense, and measures of social class and urban environment, girls are more likely than 
Table 5. Bivariate Logistic Regression for Adjudicated Guilty.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
 B Exp (B) B Exp (B) B Exp (B)
Female −0.808** 0.45 −0.866** 0.42 −0.757** 0.47
Age −0.188** 0.83 0.038 1.04 −0.001 0.99
Race
 White (ref) — — — — — —
 Black −0.008 0.99 0.454 1.56 0.517 1.68
 Hispanic −0.748 0.47 −0.368 0.69 −0.128 0.88
 Native American 0.341 1.41 −0.247 0.78 −0.165 0.85
Government aid 1.103** 3.01 1.036** 2.82
Poverty rate in zip 0.004 1.00 0.002 1.00
Geographic area
 Rural (ref) — — — —
 Metro −2.010** 0.13 −2.096** 0.12
 City-town 1.234** 3.44 1.237** 3.45
Number of priors 0.230** 1.26
Offense type
 Runaway (ref) — —
 Truancy 0.021 1.02
 Behavior problems 1.945 6.99
 In need of supervision 0.465 1.56
Constant 3.498** 0.345 1.42 0.290 1.34
−2 log likelihood 566.79 415.98 396.93  
N 433 433 433  
Note. Coefficients (B) and Odds Ratios (Exp B).
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.
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boys to have their status offense cases filed for review (confirming the second hypoth-
esis), less likely than boys to be adjudicated guilty (confirming the third hypothesis), 
and just as likely as boys to be sentenced to custody as opposed to probation (discon-
firming the fourth hypothesis). We predicted the greater likelihood of case filing (the 
second hypothesis) as an effect of judicial paternalism through both the chivalry and 
evil woman hypotheses. Prosecutors’ greater willingness to file petitions for girls’ 
rather than boys’ status offenses may stem from an interest in protecting girls through 
greater scrutiny of their cases (chivalry hypothesis), or from an inclination to want to 
punish female status offenders for violating gender norms (evil woman hypothesis).
Whether confirmation of the second hypothesis reflects chivalric leniency or harsh-
ness against evil women may be illuminated to some degree by the outcome of the 
adjudication phase of the juvenile justice process. The third hypothesis predicted that 
girls would be less likely to receive guilty adjudications, and was confirmed by data 
from the 433 status offenders whose petitions were filed. Note from the operational 
Table 6. Bivariate Logistic Regression for Custody-Detention: Coefficients (B) and Odds 
Ratios (Exp B).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
 B Exp (B) B Exp (B) B Exp (B)
Female 0.481 1.62 0.370 1.45 0.289 1.34
Age −0.099 0.91 0.128 1.14 0.100 1.12
Race
 White (ref) — — — — — —
 Black −0.091 0.91 0.444 1.56 0.774 2.17
 Hispanic 0.430 1.54 0.701 2.02 0.643 1.90
 Native American 0.065 .107 0.022 1.02 0.299 1.35
Government aid 1.276** 1.02 1.304** 3.69
Poverty rate in zip −0.017 0.98 −0.022 0.98
Geographic area
 Rural (ref) — — — —
 Metro −1.068* 0.34 −1.805** 0.16
 City-town −0.418 .066 −0.504 0.60
Number of priors 0.216** 1.24
Offense type
 Runaway (ref) — —
 Truancy −2.150** 0.12
 Behavior problems −1.351 0.26
 In need of supervision −0.713 0.49
Constant 0.335 1.40 −3.218 0.04 −2.215 0.11
−2 log likelihood 275.85 256.33 231.49  
N 229 229 229  
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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definition of this dichotomous dependent variable (and Figure 2) that the alternative to 
being adjudicated guilty was primarily dismissal, with a few receiving “informal pro-
bation.” Thus, after prosecutors filed petitions for status offenses, courts were more 
likely to allow the cases to be dismissed, or in a few cases sent to informal probation, 
when the cases involved girls than boys. We proposed that confirmation of this hypoth-
esis would reflect chivalry, the idea being that once girls had been properly looked 
after by filing the petition and having the case formally reviewed (the disparity in 
favor of filing petitions against female status offenders was, in this interpretation, the 
result of protective, chivalric attitudes), the juvenile justice system did not see a reason 
to subject them to the harsh conditions of either probation and custody.
However, if confirmation of the second and third hypotheses supports the conclu-
sion that bounded rationality is being manifest through chivalric attitudes, why did the 
final analysis disconfirm the fourth hypothesis? Although girls were more likely sen-
tenced to custody than probation in the bivariate analyses, the relationship was very 
weak, and disappeared when control measures were considered in the multivariate 
models. Thus, when status offenders are adjudicated guilty, girls are just as likely as 
boys to receive a custody sentence as opposed to a probation sentence. It seems 
unlikely, however, that formal rationality suddenly reasserts itself in the final phase of 
the juvenile justice process. Alternatively, once female status offenders are adjudicated 
guilty, the juvenile court appeared to either (a) no longer view female status offenders 
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Figure 3. Predicted probabilities for three levels of disposition by gender.
Note. Predicted probabilities reflect binary logistic regression equations (see Model 3 in each of Tables 4, 
5, and 6), imputing gender and mean values for all other variables (predicted values = 1 / [1 + e- log odds]).
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in the same chivalric light or (b) consider custody a more “protective” outcome than 
probation. Considering the greater inclination of the court to dismiss girls’ petitions 
once filed, we find the latter interpretation counterintuitive, and thus the possibility 
remains that some degree of judicial paternalism in this last phase may reflect harsh-
ness toward female status offenders in a way that is incongruent with previous phases.
Limitations
The use of data from one state, Oklahoma, presents an important challenge in the gen-
eralizability of the findings. While single-state data collection is common in criminal 
justice research, we certainly cannot assume that the population, justice system, or 
social processes (e.g., legal proceedings, attitudes of judges and other juvenile justice 
professionals) in Oklahoma are closely similar to all other states in the United States. 
However, we can situate the state’s demographics in comparison with national aver-
ages, and infer some degree of representativeness to suggest that these data may not be 
too dissimilar. Oklahoma’s 3.8 million residents make it a less populous state than the 
average of 6.2 million (4.5 million in absence of the four most populous states: 
California, New York, Florida, and Texas), but is demographically more similar to 
U.S. averages than many others. In 2012, 23.5% of Americans were under 18 (24.6% 
of Oklahomans), 63.0% non-Hispanic White (67.9% of Oklahomans), and 14.9% 
below poverty (16.6% of Oklahomans; U.S. Census, 2012). Overall crime reporting 
was somewhat higher for both violent (387 per 100,000 population in the United States 
and 469 in Oklahoma) and non-violent offenses (2,859 per 100,000 in the United 
States and 3,401 in Oklahoma); however, Oklahoma’s arrest rate of 3,561 per 100,000 
population was slightly lower than the nation’s 3,918 (Uniform Crime Reports, 2012). 
Finally, while Oklahoma’s adult incarceration rate of 631 per 100,000 population is 
higher than the nation’s 492 (Carson & Sabol, 2012), the rate of juvenile detention is 
somewhat lower at 219 per 100,000 population, compared with 279 for the United 
States (Sickmund, 2010). Using juvenile justice data from other states in future 
research will serve to further confirm, disconfirm, and expand on our findings.
Another important limitation in the present study is the age of the 2001 data. While 
the challenge of obtaining the most current juvenile system records, especially those 
that involve outcomes of court proceedings, can make the use of slightly older data 
necessary and common—for example, Guevara et al. (2006) use data from 1990 to 
1994—justice practices and norms certainly undergo changes in the span of 12 years. 
Such developments are of interest to researchers studying gender differentials in the 
treatment of juveniles, and we urge readers to keep these temporal effects in mind.
Conclusion and Directions for Future Research
While the present study cannot precisely determine the extent to which judicial pater-
nalism reflects the leniency of the chivalry hypothesis or the harshness of the evil 
woman hypothesis, both the petition filing phase and the adjudication phase main-
tained significant gender disparities after controlling for measures that reflected either 
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formal rationality (prior offenses, type of status offense) or other non-paternalistic 
bounded rationality (race, social class, urban environment). Thus, the data suggest the 
possibility of both leniency and harshness occurring at different stages in the justice 
process, and thus confirm the presence of judicial paternalism as a form of bounded 
rationality. Future studies may benefit from attempts to measure prosecutors’ and 
judges’ attitudes regarding male and female juvenile offenders in order to discern 
greater nuances in the way that paternalism is asserted.
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Notes
1. Offenses with comparable gender ratios include running away, defiance of parental author-
ity, and alcohol and tobacco use.
2. The Office of Juvenile Affairs (OJA) does not provide any greater detail on the circum-
stances surrounding these designations, thus we advise interpreting them with caution. 
Especially “In Need of Supervision,” which is the precise wording of the offense category in 
the OJA statutory code, may involve a variety of juvenile offender situations.
3. Due to smaller numbers of observations in the last stage of the outcome process, larger pro-
portionate differences can still fail to (or only weakly attain) statistical significance.
4. Given N = 3,329, this difference is large enough to satisfy face validity without performing 
a chi-square.
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